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The merchant marine has played an integral part in the
development of the United States throughout our history.
Yet in these modern times of sophisticated weaponry and
instantaneous global communications, the United States and
its merchant marine face a crisis. As has been done in
the past, the question has to be asked as to whether or
not the nation should have a strong merchant marine. Is
a U.S. -flag merchant marine necessary? If the answer is
yes, which the author assumes to be the case, then how might
that best be achieved?
The last time these questions were raised, the answer
was yes also. The result was the Merchant Marine Act of
1936. Now 48 years old, it still stands as the basis for
national maritime policy. Facing legislators and policy
makers today are many options from which to choose. Many
have been tried before, many are new. The results of the
past policies must be considered if an intelligent choice
is to be made. This thesis may provide some insight.
B. INTEREST AND PURPOSE
As a student of transportation and professionally a
Naval officer, the author was concerned that little was
known baout the problems of the U.S. merchant marine and
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its relationship with the military. In fact, the normal
Navy officer knows very little about U.S. laws and
regulations regarding the U.S. maritime industry. In under-
taking this study, it was the intent of the author to provide,
as simply as possible, the facts, figures, problems, and
options currently facing the maritime industry.
But all of those facts, figures, and history can almost
be considered irrelevant. For what is needed is a maritime
policy for the future. The members of the maritime industry,
it would seem, would be an excellent source of information
as to what policies have worked in the past and what is
needed in the future. Therefore, in addition to conducting
literary research, the opinions, impressions and thoughts
of industry representatives were included. Their frankness
and genuine concern regarding their own interests and the
interests of the nation were very much appreciated and
enlightening. Without their input, this work would be
meaningless
.
C. THE NATURE OF THE PROBLEM
In analyzing the U.S. merchant marine today, several
important facts stand out. First of all, if the question
was strictly economic in nature, one would have to seriously
question the need for a merchant marine at all. Ships can
be built better, faster, and cheaper overseas. Ships can
be operated with fewer men, less expensively with foreign
12
crews rather than U.S. crews. Yet there still exist a
few companies who can make it work.
The issue is not solely an economic one. The national
security of the United States must also be considered.
With a defense posture that requires advance deployment
of troops overseas, strategic sealift is a vital mission
that requires a strong and healthy merchant marine. Today,
the ability of our merchant marine to meet the requirements
that would be placed upon it in the event of an emergency
should be seriously questioned. The question then becomes
what is needed and how is it best achieved.
D. ASSUMPTIONS
In the writing of this thesis, the author has made the
following assumptions:
1. that the U.S. merchant marine is vital to the economic
and military security of the nation;
2. that, although it would be impossible to interview
everyone involved in the maritime industry, selected
interviews from a wide variety of participants in
the shipping and shipbuilding industries would provide
valuable insight that is worthy of consideration;
3. that the present policies and regulations in effect
regarding the maritime industries are ineffective
at promoting and maintaining a healthy and viable
merchant marine, and;
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4. future policy decisions will come from those already
proposed in that the Congress is incapable of totally
rewriting a comprehensive Merchant Marine Act that
would address all facets of the industry. Therefore,
changes would probably be piecemeal, addressing each
facet of the industry separately as has been done
since 1936.
E. ORGANIZATION
This thesis is divided into an introduction, five
research chapters, and a final chapter of conclusions.
Chapters II and III provide a historical review of the U.S
maritime industry from its beginnings to the 1980's. Chapter
IV addresses the current assessment of our national security
requirements while providing a brief glimpse of the current
government-sponsored programs initiated to provide a short-
term response capability. Chapter V reviews all of the
known legislative proposals currently being reviewed and
studied by the Reagan administration and the Congress.
Chapter VI outlines the opinions, sometimes rather candid,
of representatives from within various maritime industries.
Finally, Chapter VII describes the conclusions of the author
based on the research presented in the preceding chapters.
It should be noted that the conclusions and recommendations




. HISTORICAL REVIEW OF LEGISLATION
Since the earliest days of the nation, shipping and
shipbuilding have occupied the minds of legislators as an
important factor in the American economy and defense. As
such, government support of American ships has evolved and
continues to evolve much in response to the needs of the
nation, and in more recent times, in response to the needs
of the maritime industry itself. In order to understand
the current state of the merchant marine one needs to be
aware of exactly how the industry evolved. This chapter
is a summary of the history of the United States merchant
marine and the legislation and policies that have resulted
in what exists today.
A. EARLY EVOLUTION AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE U.S. MERCHANT
MARINE
The first English colonial settlers came to America
on ships. From those earliest days in the development of
the nation, the sea became an economic mainstay of life
in the colonies. The early government of the United States
recognized the necessity of maintaining a strong American
merchant marine. Maintaining an adequate supply of U.S.
ships could insure that essential trade routes would not
be subject to the whims of other foreign vessels which might
be unreliable. The first regulation of American ships came
15
about as early as the First Continental Congress of 1789.
The Congress ruled that only American-built ships could
fly the American flag and it offered a ten percent reduction
in import taxes for items carried in American bottoms.
Between 1789 and 1828, Congress passed at least fifty
different tariff and other laws designed to protect and
encourage American shipbuilding and shipowning. [1:51-52]
B. THE GOLDEN YEARS: 1789-1850
In addition to import tax and flagging restriction,
foreign vessels who participated in the domestic coastwise
trade were subjected to such heavy taxation by the individual
states that it became unprofitable to participate in that
trade unless the vessels were American-built and American
owned. These actions were a prelude to the first cabotage
acts that were introduced in the form of the Navigation
Act of 1817, whereby foreign vessels were banned from the
domestic trade entirely. [1:51-52]
During the period between the Revolution and the Civil
War, there was vigorous growth for American shipping and
shipbuilding and it is fondly remembered as the "Golden
Age". American ships were the best constructed and most
durable ships in the world. With a virtually unlimited
supply of wood for vessels, American shipbuilding flourished.
American merchants and shippers seized commercial
opportunities to develop new trade routes and build a merchant
16
marine that became a major factor in world trade. American
ships were of lower cost and competitively lower priced
than those of some of the other "established" maritime nations
such as Great Britain. During this period the U.S. merchant
fleet grew to a position of prominence, second only to
England. [2: 7-8]
It was during the period prior to the Civil War that
the first government subsidy program was initiated. As
early as 1845, Congress authorized the Postmaster General
to make contracts with American vessels for the transporta-
tion of mail. During these early periods, as it is today,
competition with foreign vessels often led to new designs,
new technology, and the need to provide better service to
shippers at a lower cost. The American postal subsidy was
legislated in response to an English subsidy program for
the transport of English mail. [1:55] These additional
funds to American shippers enabled them to invest and compete
on a more equal basis. This underlying idea of cost parity
continues today with other federal subsidy programs.
C. THE CIVIL WAR TO WORLD WAR I
Whereas the period prior to the Civil War was considered
the "Golden Age" for American shipping and shipbuilding,
the period of the Civil War to World War I was a period
of major decline. This period was significant to the U.S.
merchant marine for two reasons. First, during the Civil
War, the South and North decimated each other's vessels
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in an attempt to interdict shipping. Merchants of American
and foreign countries were afraid to ship their goods in
American ships because of these attacks. By the end of
the Civil War, American shipowners had sold almost one-third
of their American fleet to foreign shipowners in order to
protect their investments. Secondly, technological change
in the form of steel ships came and by-passed the American
shipbuilding industry. Wood had been easily accessible
to the American shipbuilder, steel was not. The cost of
U.S. steel was much higher than that of European steel.
As a result, American steel-built ships, when they were
finally built, cost forty to seventy-five percent more than
the European vessel. U.S. investors looked to foreign-built
vessels and therefore foreign registration. [1:56-58]
The United States grew to rely heavily on foreign-built
and foreign-registered vessels to carry its commerce. At
the outset of World War I, much of the foreign tonnage was
no longer accessible to the American shipper.
As an example of just how drastic the decline during
the period from 1850 to 1916 was, there were periods when
the American merchant marine virtually disappeared from
the seas. In 1850, American ships carried between seventy-
two and seventy-three percent of the nation's foreign
commerce. By 1900, this figure was ten percent and by 1910,
it had dropped to 8.7 percent. [3:20]
The end result was that the United States had virtually
no merchant marine at the outbreak of World War I. The
United States was consequently unable to provide the shipping
service necessary to maintain its economy or to meet its
military needs at the time. Other nations withdrew their
fleets from trade routes that were essential to the U.S.
commerce. [4:45]
D. EARLY TWENTIETH CENTURY LEGISLATION, 1900-1935.
During this period, several government policies and
regulations were passed by Congress that still impact on
today's merchant marine. The Seaman's Act of 1915 increased
the standards of working and safety for seamen serving on
U.S. flag vessels. It strengthened the seafaring unions
and laid the initial requirements for use of higher-cost
American crews. The Merchant Marine Act of 1916 was passed
in response to the demand for bottoms required to support
the war effort. This act resulted in a largely government-
owned fleet of which many were unfit as commercial vessels.
These vessels were built in private yards as opposed to
government yards at nearly two and a half times the cost.
Government inefficiencies were commonplace even then.
[1:64-66]
The Merchant Marine Act of 1916 also established the
Shipping Board which was the forerunner of today's government
maritime bodies, the Maritime Administration and the Federal
Maritime Commission. The Shipping Board was originally
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designed to promote and assist the U.S. merchant marine.
The Board was authorized to organize and develop a government
corporation to carry out its programs which included
purchasing, building, and operating government-owned ships.
The United States emerged from its massive shipbuilding
program by producing the world's largest merchant fleet,
most of which was government built and owned.
The government's problem then was to determine what
should be done with this fleet. The Merchant Marine Act
of 1920, more commonly referred to as the Jones Act, was
the Congressional response. It had two main objectives: to
provide for the transfer of the Shipping Board's vast fleet
of ships to private hands; and secondly, to establish a
framework in which the fleet could operate profitably under
private management. [2:12-13]
Congress declared in Section 1 of the 1920 Act:
...That it is necessary for the national defense and
for the proper growth of its foreign and domestic
commerce that the United States shall have a merchant
marine of the best equipped and most suitable types
of vessels sufficient to carry the greater portion
of its commerce and serve as a naval or military auxiliary
in time of war or national emergency ultimately to
be owned and operated privately by citizens of the
United States; and it is hereby declared to be the
policy of the United States to do whatever may be
necessary to develop and encourage the maintenance
of such a merchant marine, and, insofar as may not
be inconsistent with the express provisions of the
Act, the United States Shipping Board shall, in the
disposition of vessels and shipping property as hereinafter
provided, in the making of rules and regulations,
and in the administration of the shipping laws always
in view this purpose and object as the primary end
to be obtained. [5]
Although modified by the 1936 Merchant Marine Act by
substituting the word "substantial" for "greater" in the
phrase "the greater portion of its commerce", this policy
remains the basis for national maritime policy even today.
The Merchant Marine Act of 1920 also acted to reaffirm
and strengthen the long standing practice of cabotage, that
is, reserving all coastal trade, including trade with off-
shore possessions, to U.S. built, owned, and crewed ships.
So important was this reaffirmation that even today, the
use of the term "Jones Act" usually refers to cabotage and
the domestic trade.
Due to the vast number of ships available to the merchant
marine in the early twenties, carriage of U.S. foreign trade
reached a high of fifty one percent on U.S. vessels. That
share was not maintained and, except for World War II, has
declined steadily. By 1933, the U.S. flag share had fallen
to thirty three percent. [2:14]
Facing the fact that the implementors of the Merchant
Marine Act of 1920 had not successfully met their objectives
and recognizing the fact that the merchant marine was
declining, Congress reacted by enacting the Merchant Marine
Act of 1928. The Act established the first construction
loan fund that was attractive to American shipowners. It
also broadened the benefits of the mail subsidies. In order
to qualify for the subsidy, vessels were required to have
American officers and eventually two-thirds American crew.
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The actual awarding of these contracts and the rates at
which they were applied were grossly mismanaged. All in
all, these government efforts at aiding an overall ailing
merchant marine were ineffective and fraught with mismanage
ment and corruption. New legislation was needed, a new
foundation on which to build an effective merchant marine.
The Merchant Marine Act of 1936 was the result. [1:68-72]
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Ill
. MODERN TIMES - THE 1936 ACT TO THE PRESENT
Prior to the Merchant Marine Act of 1936, subsidy pro-
grams were more or less hidden under the guise of the postal
contracts. Their mismanagement particularly dissatisfied
Congress and the overall dwindling merchant marine led to
the question of whether or not a strong merchant marine
was even required or necessary. President Franklin Roosevelt
said yes, and he proposed an end to the disguised subsidies
and recommended a new, direct subsidy program, one that
would favor a strong American merchant marine and would
at the same time fulfill the intent of earlier Shipping
Acts. The result was the Merchant Marine Act of 1936, the
preamble of which still stands as the basis for government
policy regarding the merchant marine industry. It reads:
It is necessary for the national defense and development
of its foreign and domestic commerce that the United
States shall have a merchant marine (a) sufficient to
carry its domestic water-borne export and import foreign
commerce of the United States and to provide shipping
service essential for maintaining the flow of such domestic
and foreign water-borne commerce at all times, (b) capable
of serving as a naval and military auxiliary in time of
war or national emergency, (c) owned and operated under
the United States flag by citizens of the United States
insofar as may be practicable, (d) composed of the best-
equipped, safest, and most suitable types of vessels,
constructed in the United States and manned with trained
and efficient citizen personnel, and (e) supplemented
by efficient facilities for shipbuilding and ship repair.
It is hereby declared to be the policy of the United States
to foster the development and encourage the maintenance
of such a merchant marine. [6]
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To administer the government aid established in the
Merchant Marine Act of 1936, the Act also established the
U.S. Maritime Commission. The Commission originally dealt
with both regulatory and promotional functions associated
with the merchant marine. The Commission lasted until 1950
when the promotional duties were assigned to the newly estab-
lished Maritime Administration (MARAD). The regulatory
duties were assigned to the Federal Maritime Board which,
in 1961, evolved to the current Federal Maritime Commission
(FMC) . [7: 35]
A. DIRECT SUBSIDIZATION
The major objective of the Merchant Marine Act of 1936
was to create a substantial fleet of U.S. flag merchant
ships, built in U.S. shipyards, owned and crewed by citizens.
To achieve this, several administrative programs were
developed within the Act.
1. Title V - Construction Differential Subsidy (CDS)
To stimulate shipbuilding in the United States,
the Merchant Marine Act of 1936 provides for a construction
differential subsidy, a direct subsidy that covers the
difference in price between a ship built in the United States
and the price that would be paid for the same ship if built
abroad. The basis of the CDS subsidy is cost parity. Under
this title, any U.S. citizen or shipyard may apply for the
subsidy under the following conditions:
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a. The vessel must be used in the foreign commerce,
that is foreign trade. Provisions are made if the
vessel is operated in the domestic trade for pro-
rating repayment of CDS funds,
b. Funds must be used for the construction of a
new vessel or reconstruction or reconditioning
of an existing vessel,
c. The plans for the vessel must be approved by the Navy
Department which determines the suitability of the
vessels for use by the government in times of war
or national emergency. In other words, the plans must
be approved by the Navy regarding the incorporation
of national defense features,
d. A downpayment of 25 percent of the value of the vessel
must be paid, the remainder to be paid over 25 years,
and
e. The vessel must be registered in the U.S. for at least
25 years, or as long as principal or interest is owed
the government. [1:79-80]
With the overall intent to be the providing of cost
parity with foreign competitors, the construction differ-
ential subsidy was intended to help promote the higher-cost
American shipbuilding industry. It also enabled investors
to meet the requirement for American flagging of vessels




There are, however, limitations. The CDS could
reimburse owners up to only 50 percent of the cost for
competitive bidding contracts or 35 percent for negotiated
contracts. [4:37-40]
2. Title VI - Operating Differential Subsidy (OPS)
To stimulate operation of American-built ships with
American crews, the Merchant Marine Act of 1936 also provided
for an operating differential subsidy (ODS), another direct
subsidy intended to cover the difference in operating costs
between an American operator and his foreign competitors.
Again, this subsidy was intended to create or foster some
cost parity between American and foreign ship operators,
and it was limited to vessels carrying freight for the essen-
tial foreign trade, primarily liners and not the oil or
bulk trade. Included in the operating costs are: wages
for officers and crew; maintenance and repair; and insurance,
both hull and machinery as well as protection and indemnity.
[1:53]
The ships eligible to receive such aid must be
vessels constructed in the United States of steel and must
be steam or motor-driven and of a size and type that would
be efficient and promote the foreign commerce. This subsidy
was not to be paid over a period exceeding 20 years, nor
for a vessel over 25 years of age unless an exemption was
specifically applied for. This requirement would help to
promote replacement of older vessels.
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It is significant to note that wages account for
about eighty-five percent of the ODS, while insurance
accounts for eight percent, and maintenance and repairs
about six percent. [1:84]
B. INDIRECT SUBSIDIZATION
Several other provisions of the 1936 Act provided for
indirect benefits available to the American shipowners and
operators. These were termed indirect because they did not
involve the direct outlay of funds from the government,
but instead provided for either monetary or preferential
treatment of shipowners and operators, thereby further
enhancing their competitive position.
1. Title XI - Federal Ship Mortgage and Loan Insurance
Program
Perhaps the most successful of all government
activities designed to promote the merchant marine, this
Title XI insures commercial loans and mortgages to finance
a fixed proportion (up to 87.5 percent for nonsubs id i zed
vessels and 75 percent for subsidized vessels) of the actual
cost of construction, reconstruction, or reconditioning
of U.S. -built vessels. This has been attractive to investors
because it extends up to 25 years, covering the expected
economic life of the vessel and allows debt financing to
be spread out over a long term, thereby hopefully insuring
a relatively stable income for the vessel owner. [4:54-55]
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Title XI also created another major aid to the ship-
owner with the Captial Reserve Fund. This fund enabled
subsidized American shipping companies to deposit a specified
portion of their revenues in a special construction fund.
Revenues deposited in this fund were exempt from taxes and
could eventually be used for construction of new vessels.
[7:36-37]
2. Title XII - War Risk Insurance
This title can provide insurance against loss or
damage by war risks to U.S. water-borne commerce whenever
such insurance cannot be obtained at reasonable rates from




The Merchant Marine Act of 1936 also established
a cargo preference system that reaffirmed several earlier
such provisions. There have been several cargo preference
laws passed, such as the mail subsidies and others. Cabotage
laws such as the Jones Act provide that materials transported
in the domestic trade of the United States, that is between
U.S. ports, be carried by U.S. -flagged vessels. Other such
preferential laws include the following:
a. The 1904 Military Transportation Act gives U.S. -flag
vessels preference in the transportation of supplies
for the armed services in direct overseas support
of the U.S. military,
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b. In 1934, Congress enacted Public Resolution No. 17
which applies to cargoes obtained through loans granted
by the Export-Import Bank. This Resolution stipulates
that goods for exportation from the United States,
procured with the Bank's loans, must be carried on
U.S. -flag ships except when waivers are granted by
the Maritime Administration, as provided in the
Resolution, and
c. Since the 1936 Act, the Cargo Preference Act of 1954,
more often referred to as Public Law 83-664, requires
that at least fifty percent of all government generated
cargo must be transported on privately-owned U.S. -flag
vessels to the extent of their availability. These
cargoes include food and other aid.
The effect of such legislation guaranteed U.S. carriers
a certain amount of business.
C. OTHER PROVISIONS
The Merchant Marine Act of 1936 contained one other
very important provision. If it was found that the subsidies
and financing aids did not stimulate private investment,
the Act authorized the government to build ships and to
charter them to American commercial operators. [2:24]
Overall, the Merchant Marine Act of 1936 is a remarkably
comprehensive and durable piece of legislations that has
endured as the primary basis and policy for the merchant
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marine for nearly fifty years. Its intent was to serve
both the shipbuilders and the shipowners/operators. Should
the provisions of the Act ever have been fully implemented,
the effects might be more positive than they have been.
D. THE MERCHANT MARINE: 1936-1984
The history of merchant marine legislation after 1936
has been one of primarily amending and refining the 1936
Act to meet the current and changing demands of the maritime
industry. [1:90] Shortly after the Act's passage, World
War II broke out in Europe and for the second time in this
century, the United States found itself severely hampered
by a lack of shipping assets. As with World War I, a massive
shipbuilding program was instituted. This war, in which
American forces were engaged in a global conflict, demon-
strated emphatically how acutely national security in such
a conflict is dependent upon cargo shipping.
At the outset of the War, the merchant marine's
percentage of world-wide tonnage had declined to 16.6
percent. Due to the emergency shipbuilding program which
produced nearly 5,000 ships efficiently and quickly, the
United States possessed nearly sixty percent of the world's
tonnage at the war's end. [1:90-91]
With the war over, the United States was again faced
with the problem of disposing of a large government-owned
fleet of about 4,500 ships, more than all other nations
combined. The Merchant Ship Sales Act of 1946 established
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the guidelines for the demobi
1
izaton and disposal of this
large fleet. The purpose of this act was to sell as many
vessels as possible on a priority basis to the U.S. merchant
marine and then to other foreign, friendly nations. Nearly
2,000 ships were sold under this program, of which nearly
fifty-seven percent went to foreigners. Of the remaining
ships, about 1,400 were mothballed in the National Defense
Reserve Fleet, available for future mobilization in time
of emergency. [2:17]
Throughout the 1950's and 1960's, government aid to
the merchant marine continued as prescribed in the Merchant
Marine Act of 1936. The provisions of the Act proved durable,
yet, except for the Korean War which produced another boom
to shipping, the merchant marine continued to decline in
numbers and tonnage. [7:38-39]
The Vietnam crisis placed a renewed demand for shipping
commencing in 1965. It is significant to note that some
ninety-eight percent of the military cargoes deployed to
Vietnam were carried by ship. [1:92] Yet, in spite of having
a once dominant position in world shipping, the United States
merchant marine continued to decline. Foreign competition,
driven by post-war facilities and innovative management,
was able to achieve an overall price leadership position
in shipbuilding. This made it difficult for U.S. shipyards
to meet prices offered by foreign shipbuilders. By 1970,
the average age of the U.S. -flag fleet was nearly twenty-two
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years, twice that of the United Kingdom and three times
that of Japan. [2:18]
The 1936 Act had set the stage for adequate construction
of a proper mix of cargo ships, bulk carriers, and tankers
for the U.S. flag fleet. However, with the post-war surplus
of ships, ship production never became a gradual, planned
system. In 1969, about sixty percent of all U.S. -flag ships
were over 20 years old and in that year, U.S. ships carried
the smallest percentage (4.6) of the nation's own cargo
in this century up to that time. [8:13]
1. The Merchant Marine Act of 1970
In perpetuating the principles of its parent Act,
the 1936 Act, the Merchant Marine Act of 1970 was an attempt
to bolster both the merchant marine and the shipbuilding
industry. It also attempted to update provisions of the
1936 Act by considering changes in the industry regarding
technology, ship size, speed and manning requirements as
well as changes in the nature of commodities being traded.
The direct objective of the 1970 Act was, however, to
revitalize the merchant marine by stimulating the con-
struction of 300 modern merchant ships during the period
1971-1980. [1:92-93]
In authorizing a program to rebuild the merchant
marine, standardized designs, built with series production
methods would presumably promote and allow shipbuilders
to take advantage of certain economies of scale and decrease
32
costs by utilizing series construction methods such as those
proven during World War II. Addi t ional ly , construction
differential subsidies were to be paid directly to the ship-
builder and in expanding the CDS and ODS coverage, bulk
carriers and tankers were made eligible, thereby hopefully
removing a major barrier to the registration of the oil/bulk
carriers under the U.S. flag instead of those of the so-
called Flags of Convenience or Flags of Necessity, depending
on one's point of view. [2:18]
The 1970 Act also expanded the statutory limit for
funds for the Federal Ship Mortgage Insurance program.
This effort was aimed at bolstering primarily the ship-
building industry.
The Merchant Marine Act of 1970 also authorized
carriers to establish capital construction funds (CCF) which
entitled a shipowner to deposit a proportion of his revenues
into a tax-free interest-bearing account similar to the
provisions of the 1936 Act's capital reserve funds. The
purpose remained to be for the later financing of U.S. con-
struction orders, but the difference was that the capital
construction funds were open to all American-flag carriers,
not just those who were subsidized. The provisions also
liberalized the specifications as to which funds and revenues
could be deposited. The immediate benefit was to the ship-
owners who were able to defer taxes on revenues while the
long term benefits were to the U.S. shipbuilding industry
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who were to be the recipients of later shipbuilding orders
utilizing the funds. [9:55]
Spurred on by the provisions of the 1970 Act, there
was an early surge in shipbuilding demand. The Act's primary
goal or target of construction of 300 ships was not achieved,
however, with approximately 175 ships constructed during
the decade of the 1970's. [10:31] These new vessels did
not increase appreciably the number of ships in the U.S. merchant
marine as they replaced older vessels that were retired,
scrapped, or sold overseas. In this light, one might conclude





The 1980's and the Reagan Administration
The 1980's have seen little change in the U.S.
merchant marine regarding the number of vessels. The trend
is still a slow decline in the number of vessels. What
has been increasing has been the average age of those vessels
which now stands at twenty-three years. Older vessels are
not being replaced. As of January 1, 1983, the Maritime
Administration listed 832 vessels under the U.S. flag.
That total comprises only 3.3 percent of the world fleet
of merchant vessels. [11]
Although the number of vessels in the U.S. flag
fleet has dropped, the fleet's capacity has not decreased.
Even during a period of international shipping recession
the merchant marine has been able to hold its own. What
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this means is that the ships' cargo carrying capacity is
increasing, thereby seeking economies of scale advantages.
[12:24-26]
With the inauguration of President Reagan in January
of 1981, there was a new sense of optimism in the maritime
industries. The Reagan administration appeared to be
dedicated to a strong national defense and the corresponding
merchant marine and its shipbuilding base. In an effort
to bolster a sagging economy, the Reagan administration
was able to revise the tax laws in 1981, approving an
accelerated depreciation tax schedule which reduced
depreciation schedules to five years while retaining the
investment tax credits made available by the Tax Reform
Act of 1976. This enabled U.S. owners to recover the capital
in their ships in only five years as compared to the
straight-line method, used previously, which spread the
depreciation over the useful life of the ship, normally
twenty-five years. [13:101-108] But this was just a beginning
of changes to legislation that would affect the U.S. merchant
marine.
a. The Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1981.
While the Reagan Administration on one hand
favored the construction of a 600-ship Navy and undertook
budget measures to begin such a program, it was likewise
faced with the problem of a growing deficit and pressure
to reduce government spending. The merchant marine industry
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was to feel the results of these pressures. The Reagan
administration's proposed budget for Fiscal Year (FY) 1982
cut construction differential subsidy (CDS) funds from the
budget. Other maritime programs such as the Title XI ship
mortgage guarantees also found funds reduced. [14]
As a follow-on to the budget, the Omnibus Budget
Reconciliation Act of 1981 contained a provision which
amended the Merchant Marine Act of 1936. Designated as
Section 615 of the 1936 Act, this provision would qualify
foreign-built merchant vessels of 5,000 deadweight tons
and over for operating differential subsidy (ODS) if
sufficient CDS funds were not available. Operators were
required to receive written certification from the Secretary
of Transportation that its CDS application could not be
approved due to the unavailability of funds in the CDS
account. During FY 1982, Section 615 permission was granted
to eighteen companies to construct, reconstruct, or acquire
vessels in foreign shipyards. Table 3.1 lists the major
applicants for this certification during FY 1982. [15:3]
This provision has since received the continuing
support of the Reagan administration. The last CDS con-
tracts were written in FY 1981. At the same time, while
no new ODS contracts are being written, existing contracts
are being honored. Therefore, the prospects for CDS payments
and ODS contracts in the future are extremely slim. Table
3.2 shows the historical record of ODS and CDS outlays.
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TABLE 3.1 SECTION 615 APPROVALS AS OF SEPTEMBER 30, 1983
Estimated
Applicant Project Location Cost
Aeron Marine 1 to 2 Bulk Unknown $40,000,000
Carriers ,New
American President Reconstruct Japan $10,160, 000
Lines, Inc. 3 Containerships
Delta Steamship Build 10 new Not $350, 000, 000
Lines vessels Available
Equity Marine, I, II Build 6 0/B/O Japan & $168,000,000
& III, Inc. Carriers Korea
Equity Bulkships,
I, II, & III, Inc.
First American Build 2 Bulk/ Korea $69,100,000
Bulk Carrier Inc. Container vessels
Hvide Shipping, Reconstruct Barge Not Available Unknown
Inc. into Chemical Tanker
Margate Shipping Retrofit 3 Tankers Portugal $3, 324, 484
Moore McCormack Retrofit 3 Tankers Norway $7,350,000
Bulk Transport
Ogden Marine, Inc. Build 2 Dry-Bulk Japan $48,971, 596
Carriers
Phoenix Bulkship Convert 3 LNG to Korea $69, 000, 000
1 , 1 1 , & III, Inc. Dry-bulk/oil carriers
United States Build 14 Jumbo Korea $780, 500,000
Lines, Inc. Containerships
United States Convert Barge Korea $4, 200, 000
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b. The Shipping Act of 1984
In March of 1984, Congress finally passed the
Shipping Act of 1984 after several years of hearings and
attempts to effect its passage. This Act broadens antitrust
immunity for international ocean liners and it revises the
regulation of shipping. This bill relaxes restrictions
on conferences among U.S. liner companies that make agreements
limiting and controlling competition in international shipping,
such as setting prices, and dividing routes and cargoes.
Pacts that meet the standards set by the legislation will
be automatically approved by the Federal Maritime Commission
and exempt from antitrust laws. The modification of these
restrictions will enhance U.S. companies competitive position
with foreign companies. [16:567-568]
While many of the long term effects of this
Act are still being analyzed, the overall impression from
the ship operators is that it is an action that has long
been overdue and necessary. Although this legislation is
not the answer to all of the questions or problems of the
U.S. merchant marine, it is definitely perceived as a step
in the right direction.
E. DISADVANTAGES OF THE U.S. FLAG
None of the actions of Congress in recent times have
had the desired effects. Today the merchant marine continues
to dwindle in numbers while at the same time growing older
as indicated earlier. Some of the original subsidies have
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been modified, while some, such as the CDS, although not
eliminated, have been left unfunded. On an interim basis
in the place of the CDS, foreign construction and repair
has been opened to owners seeking to flag in the U.S. their
vessels to be operated in the foreign trade. The authority
to obtain foreign-built vessels met with approval by the
shipowners, but it has hurt the shipbuilding and repair
industry.
When looking at the registration of American vessels,
it is difficult to indentify anything that would make the
American flag option very attractive. By far, the largest
single factor in any decision has to be high labor rates
that are paid to American crews and shipyard laborers, a
situation not likely to change. Costs for fuel, provisions,
port costs, and a good deal of other operations are common
elements of all vessel operation regardless of flag.
1 . The Shipbuilding Aspect
The Merchant Marine Act of 1936 provided for the
construction differential subsidy (CDS) and the 1970 Act
extended its provisions to cover the oil/bulk vessels thereby
making all vessels to be operated in the foreign trade of
the United States eligible for this subsidy. As previously
mentioned, this subsidy was designed to provide "cost parity"
for American shipyards compared to prices of foreign-built
ships. Although the limit on CDS funds has varied, fifty
percent has been the upper limit in recent times.
While the CDS was intended to help promote the higher-
cost shipyards, it also enabled investors to meet the require-
ment for American-flagging of vessels in that they were
required to be Amer ican^bui It with American materials. [8:35-43
The prices charged for merchant vessels by U.S.
shipyards are much higher than those built abroad, particular-
ly in comparison with ships from Japanese and Korean yards.
Not only are the U.S. prices nearly three times those of
Asian yards (see Table 3.3) but delivery time us usually
months, in some cases over a year, earlier for a foreign-
built ship.
TABLE 3.3 1983 SHIPBUILDING COSTS, U.S. AND JAPAN
(in millions of dollars)
Country Containership Bulk Carrier Tanker
(2,450 20-foot (35,000 (99,000
equivalent deadweight deadweight
units) a. tons) b. * tons)
U.S. built 132.0 69.0 96.0
Japanese built 50.8 22.5 34.3
a. Standard measurement for size of conta inerships , relating
to the number of 20 foot containers to be carried on board.
b. Standard measurement of the cargo carrying capacity of
a vessel, measured in long tons (2,240 pounds)
Source: Maritime Administration [2]
Not only is there a real wage, materials, and manhours
differential between American and foreign shipyards, but
the continuing strength of the dollar relative to other
nations has made the foreign-build option even more attractive.
Table 3.4 provides some figures for comparison. [2:21-40]
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The administration has justified the foreign build
option by stating that ships procured in this manner would
not take anything away from U.S. shipyards because those
ships would not be ordered from the higher cost yards anyway.
They state that no operator could hope to carry the burden
of the higher capital costs and yet compete in an international
market against ships built at one-third the cost. Thirty
four ships were ordered from foreign yards during the first
year of this relaxed regulation. [17:3]
The overall result has been that remaining new ship
orders to U.S. yards has been limited to domestic vessels
and orders from the U.S. Navy which have been substantial.
Although there is considerable gloom in the shipbuilding
industry regarding commercial orders, U.S. shipyards have
invested considerable amounts in recent years in anticipation
of work for the U.S. Navy. With the 600 ship Navy as a
goal of the current administration, several yards have shifted
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production from commercial vessels to Navy construction.
Construction, conversion, and repair work on behalf of the
Navy has become the mainstay of America's private shipyards
[18:23-26]
Table 3.5 shows the trends in Navy shipbuilding
programs over the last fourteen years. There have been
more orders placed in each of the last three years than
in any other year.
TABLE 3.5 NAVAL VESSELS ORDERED FROM PRIVATE YARDS
BY CALENDAR YEAR (Ships of 1,000 Light

















Source: Statistical Quarterly, American Council of
Shipbuilders Fourth Quarter, 1983.
Although Navy orders have helped to sustain U.S. ship
yards in lean times, the fact still remains that Navy work
tends to be relatively concentrated in less than a dozen
principal yards that have specialized enough to handle
complex Naval construction. As such, the slim prospects
for commercial yards means that several existing yards will
probably have to close or be consolidated with larger yards.
Although the moderate shipbuilding base is relatively stable,
Naval orders cannot sustain required shipyard capabilities.
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Whereas most people in the industry agree that there
is excess capacity in U.S. shipyards, most also agree that
the need exists for a strong and viable shipbuilding and
repair industry and that it should be able to provide the
surge capacity to build replacement vessels or repair those
damaged in times of emergency. In this regard, any capacity
that is required should be operated economically and without
the aid of the CDS in the future.
The domestic shipbuilding market has collapsed in
recent years, yet that industry is vital to support the
Navy and the U.S. merchant fleet in wartime. Wartime tasks
would include reactivation of reserve fleets, accelerated
construction, and repair activities. It has been suggested
that the current shipbuilding industry, which is now largely
sustained by Navy contracts, may not be adequate for wartime
mobilization if recent projections of shipbuilding trends
continue. [2:xv-xxv]
Any effort to maintain or expand this shipbuilding
base will require a continuing demand for the industry's
products, a condition now in doubt because of the unfavorable
competitive trends within the shipbuilding industry. In
any event, the handwriting is on the wall for the shipbuilding
industry. The problem facing the shipbuilders is that this
administration is making special efforts at finding ineffici-
encies and then eliminating them. There will be no funding
for the CDS program and ships that are to be competitive
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with foreign operators will be built in foreign yards.
The divorce between the foreign trade ship operators and
the shipbuilding industry has begun. That customer is no
longer available to the U.S. shipyards, leaving only vessels
built for the domestic trade, Naval shipbuilding orders,
and the dim possibility of a government-sponsored ship-
building program somewhere in the future.
The Shipbuilders Council of America, in its 1981
annual report notes that:
"There can be opportunities to emulate the Japanese .. .more
middle managers experiences in industrial engineering,
more co-ordination between production control and material
procurement, and more product oriented work breakdown
packages for more effective planning, scheduling and pro-
duction .. .With a sufficient throughput, the potentials
for improvement in efficiency, productivity and costs
are obviously substantial." [19]
This theme for increased throughput, more ship con-
struction orders, has been stressed throughout every annual
report since. The shipbuilders have failed to recognize
that this administration expects improvements to come from
industry innovative design and marketing efforts of their
own rather than through government subsidies and contracts.
[20: 18-19]
The U.S. shipbuilding industry is in a state of
decline. New shipbuilding orders have declined. Formerly
guaranteed customers have been authorized to build their
ships in foreign yards and the overall worldwide economic
picture all spell lean times for the U.S. shipbuilding
industry. Remaining commercial customers are still hesitant
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at placing new orders because of prohibitive capital invest-
ment requirements, and U.S. Navy orders are the only apparent
"sure thing" in the future and even that customer has a
history of uncertainty. [21:254-274]
2
. The Ship Owners/Operators Aspect
Assuming that an owner is able to overcome the capital
constraints of obtaining a vessel, whether it be built in
the United States or foreign-built, the fact that crew costs
associated with the U.S. flag operations has been well
publicized makes it no less valid. In order to assist in
this area, the Merchant Marine Acts of 1936 and 1970
instituted the operating differential subsidy (ODS) designed
to provide "cost parity" between the U.S. flag operations
and their foreign competitors. The need for such a subsidy
can be demonstrated by reviewing Department of Transportation
figures which put the daily cost of crewing a U.S. vessel
with a manning level of thirty-nine persons at $8,200 a
day. Contrast this with a crew of thirty-seven and a daily
cost of $3,061 for a foreign European community vessel and
crew of thirty-seven with a daily cost of $1,616 in the
case of a flag of convenience vessel. [22:34-38]
In 1981, U.S. flag vessels received $290,764,132
in ODS assistance from the Maritime Administration. Table
3.2 reviewed the totals for CDS and ODS outlays through
1982. With technology changing, lower crew manning levels
are possible, but government regulations regarding safety
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at sea and the seagoing unions nave not supported these
reductions. It has been estimated that wages represent
90 to 95 percent of the economic disadvantage that American
shipowners suffer if they are not subsidized. [23:26-63]
A comparison of the annual crew costs (wages and
subsistance) for a representative modern conta inership can
be seen in Table 3.6. In part this difference parallels
the difference in living standards, but a contributing
factor may be the operating differential subsidy (ODS)
itself. Crew costs beyond those of foreign competition can
simply be passed on to the government by subsidized
operators as an additional subsidy claim. Owners have not
been pressed to seek wage settlements that reflect actual
market conditions because the ODS could be relied upon to
make up the difference. [2:25]
TABLE 3.6 TYPICAL CONTAINERSHIP ANNUAL CREW COSTS,
UNITED STATES AND FOREIGN MANNING, 1983
Crew Nationality
Costs United States United Kingdon Singapore
Wages (In dollars) 3,780,000 1,433,000 570,000
Subsistance (In dollars) 124,000 82,000 53,000
Ratio to United States 1.00 0.39 00.16
Source: Maritime Administration [2:25]
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When all of the ship operating costs are compiled
and compared, it can be seen that U.S. ship operators face
significant cost disadvantages. As an example, Table 3.7
compares three significant costs faced by a U.S. shipowner
operating in the foreign trade, using hypothetical ships
as follows: Ship A - vessel U.S. -built and crewed;
Ship B - vessel foreign-built, U.S. crewed; and Ship C -
vessel foreign-built and foreign crew, much like a flag
of convenience vessel. [2:21-32]





Where Built United States Japan Japan
Crew United States United States Singapore
Propulsion Steam Diesel Diesel











Total 30,511 20,611 16,010
Costs per delivered ton 61 41 32
Note: Estimates compiled by the Congressional Budget Office












As one could imagine, the free market rates would
be set by the vessel facing the lowest costs who could
operate profitably with lower rates.
In addition to cost considerations, foreign-built
vessels do not face the same amount of regulation on the
operation of their ships, especially Coast Guard regulations
regarding vessel safety and crew manning requirements.
Likewise, their operational flexibility is unhampered.
Foreign ships are able to trade wherever the best
opportunities exist without hindrance from the U.S.
government except in the domestic trades of the United
States. [8:27]
As a result of this freedom, foreign operators are
free to establish rates utilizing a different set of rules.
Whereas U.S. flag operators are required by law to file
rates and publish changes, many foreign competitors offer
rebates or kickbacks to shippers and shipping managers that
enhance their competitive position. These actions are
considered illegal by U.S. standards but the foreign
operators don't care a bit. So not only do American
operators face considerable cost disadvantages, they also
face restrictions in the way business is conducted on the
international market. In spite of these impediments to
profitable operations, American shipowners have managed
to increase their cargo carrying capacity even though the
numbers of vessels has declined.
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The future, however, holds little prospect of change.
American shipyards and ship operators will always face higher
costs. Only technological innovation and productivity gains
will enhance their world-wide economic competitive position
if no government action is taken in the future.
IV. SEALIFT AND NATIONAL DEFENSE
It seems apparent that in the world market for shipping
services, the U.S. merchant marine faces a considerable
disadvantage. From a strictly economic aspect, current
world shipping assets appear to be sufficient to carry the
nation's commerce. What has been unfortunate is the fact
that the U.S. merchant marine has carried an ever -decl ining
portion of this nation's own trade. In 1983, U.S. trade
amounted to $470 billion. U.S. -flag ships were only moderate
participants in this trade, carrying only 16.2 percent by
value and less than 6 percent by weight. [2:35]
But carrying the nation's foreign trade is only one
reason for maintaining a merchant marine. The U.S. merchant
marine is often referred to as the "Fourth Arm of Defense".
It is truel It is also true that this "Arm" is probably
very weak, but measures are being implemented to help
strengthen it.
A. SEALIFT - A FUNDAMENTAL STRATEGY
The United States is in a truly unique position in that
nearly all U.S. allies are overseas. As such, military
strategy has been one of a forward defense. Sealift is
clearly an important aspect in the ability of the nation
to maintain such a posture.
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rThe current trends in the maritime industry can be viewed
as alarming. Numbers of ships are declining. New construc-
tion orders to shipyards are declining and as a result the
shipyard base is likewise shrinking from a lack of those
orders. These trends will probably continue if U.S. policies
and world-wide competition remain unchanged.
Recall for a moment, the basic policy objective that
has guided the merchant marine since the Merchant Marine
Act of 1920:
...That it is necessary for the national defense and the
proper growth of its foreign and domestic commerce that
the United States shall have a merchant marine....
In keeping with a forward deployed/defense strategy,
about one-fourth of the U.S. land combat power is stationed
overseas. Additionally, the remaining forces currently
stationed in the United States would eventually have to
be transported to the combat areas. Ships will carry the
bulk of these forces, their equipment, and resupplies.
It is estimated that ninety-five percent of the dry-bulk
material and over niney-nine percent of all fuel would be
transported by sealift. Could we do it? [2:xv-xviii]
In the meantime, do not forget that, while the merchant
marine would be pressed into service supporting military
forces, that same merchant marine would likewise be required
to carry the vital raw materials needed to maintain the
national economy. So not only must the shipping assets
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available to the United States support the military, it
must also continue to carry vital economic cargoes.
In citing the current state of the merchant marine and
its ability to respond to an emergency, VADM William H.
Rowden, Commander, Military Sealift Command stated:
...An even broader concern is this: A major conflict
would likely see the requisitioning of the entire U.S. -flag
dry cargo fleet for military use. And this does not begin
to consider the shipping requirements associated with
our economic security. The implications for our national
security - both economic and military - should be clear.
[24]
The requirements for vessels will be beyond what is currently
available
.
1 . Shipping Requirements
Not all ships currently registered under the U.S.-
flag would be necessarily useful to the military. From
the standpoint of national security, one needs to make an
important distinction between what is commercially economic
and efficient, and what is militarily useful. In making
that distinction, the most useful ships for supporting
military operations tend to be:
a. relatively small - able to go in and out of shallow
harbors and narrow channels;
b. flexible - able to carry a variety of cargoes,
large and small; and
c. self-sustaining - able to load and off-load
cargo without specialized shore facilities.
[2:32]
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In today's commercial market, vessels such as these do not
lend themselves to being economically competitive. The
commercial trend has been towards increased size and draft,
the ability to carry larger amounts of cargo or containers
per trip, and the requirement of specialized shore-side
cargo handling systems. This applies to dry cargo, contain-
erized cargo, and bulk carriers like the Very Large Crude
Carriers (VLCC's) or super tankers. Private carriers seek
competitive advantages through economies of scale, mostly
large vessels, which is directly opposite of those features
desired of militarily useful vessels. With the previously
mentioned lack of funding of the CDS and ODS program cut-backs,
private carriers will continue to seek these advantages.
From a military standpoint, the older-style, self-
sustaining break-bulk freighters and the relatively small,
clean-product tankers are more useful for military support.
Table 4.1, compiled by the Maritime Administration and the
TABLE 4.1 MILITARILY USEFUL SHIPS IN THE U.S. -OWNED FLEET

























Department of the Navy, shows the results of a recent assess-
ment of militarily useful vessels owned by U.S. companies.
Considering the administration's objective of a
600-ship Navy, it seems that the Navy might be able to
provide almost one-to-one protection for the militarily
useful merchant marine!
In an attempt to estimate U.S. sealift requirements,
the Department of Defense completed its latest study in
early 1984, entitled the DoD Sealift Study . Although most
parts of this study are classified, some unclassified portions
have been released. As can be seen by Table 4.2, the bottom
line indicates almost no change in the total number of ships
available to the United States in time of emergency.
2 . Shipbuilding Requirements
The importance of seapower and sealift are no less
important today that they were at the outset of World Wars
I and II. At the outset of those wars, massive shipbuilding
programs were undertaken to meet the needs generated by
wartime demand. The need to maintain a shipyard mobilization
base is likewise no less important. As defined by the Navy
and Maritime Administration, the functions of the ship-
building industrial base are distinct during wartime and
peacetime. During peacetime, requirements would be to:
a. ensure that Navy ships can be maintained in
a high degree of material readiness and modernized
with appropriate new equipment; and
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1983 Builds In Out Scrap FY 1988
89 33 2 54
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Victory 129 1 130
BreaXbulX/Partial Container ship 4 17 2 1 18
Non-Self-sustaining Containersnip 4 4 3 1 4
Self-sustaining Containersfiip 3 2 1
Sea train 4 4
LST 10 10
Troopsh lp/Schoolsh ip 17 1 16
TOTAL 171 n 8c/ 1 178
Navy-owned b/
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Up to 11 have been identified for use as TACS. The FY 84-88 FYDP funds only 6;
the remaining 5 are shown as containerships in the dataoase.
Carried under MSC fleet in database.
Three, ships to be transferred from MARAD to tOC for fleet
ballistic missile carriers and one troopship for use
as berthing ships.
5 foreign flag Ro/Ro chartered by ^eC.




b. retain enough capability to maintain or increase
the size of the Naval fleet and to build and
maintain merchant ships consistent with the
objectives of the Merchant Marine Act of 1936.
During wartime, requirements would shift to:
a. be able to support wartime needs for overhaul,
repair and battle damage repair; and
b. provide the capability to build additional Naval
and cargo ships and support a merchant marine
needed for a war or national emergency.
[2: 54-55]
The peacetime requirements will be maintained through
the DoD budget and normal commercial shipbuilding and repair
contracts. The question is whether or not the wartime require
ments can be maintained during peacetime to insure their
availability when needed, if needed.
A recent study, conducted jointly by the Navy and
Maritime Administration entitled the Shipyard Mobilization
Base Study (referred to as the SYMBA study), suggests that
the shipyard workforce should be fully one-third Larger
than just Navy work would support in order to deal with
the workload that would be imposed upon mobilization. This
increase in workload translates into 20 to 30 ships per
year to be built in U.S. shipyards over and above what is
currently contracted. As far as commercial orders go, that
means 20 to 30 ships per year. [2:56-59]
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B. MILITARY SEALIFT COMMAND - THE SHORT TERM FIX
The task of providing for the national security of the
United States has been assigned to the Department of Defense
The specific task of providing the necessary sealift assets
required to support the forward defense strategy of the
United States has been assigned to the Military Sealift
Command (MSC)
.
There are two principle sources for providing the
required sealift assets: the ships of the U.S. merchant
marine and the ships under the direct ownership and control
of the U.S. government, namely the MSC controlled fleet
and those ships in strategic reserve programs such as the
National Defense Reserve Fleet maintained by the Maritime
Administration. In analyzing the assets available in the
merchant marine, it became apparent that some immediate
improvement in the area of readily deployable assets was
necessary. Commencing in the early 1980's, the government
initiated several programs that would bolster the short-term
surge requirements that were necessary to support a forward
deployed strategy. These programs are on-going and are





This program calls for the construction and/or
conversion of thirteen cargo ships to be outfitted and fully
supplied, sailing the oceans ready to respond whenever
necessary on short notice. They will carry enough cargo,
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equipment and supplies to support three Marine brigades
for 30 days, and are designed to be fitted with cranes and
loading ramps to sustain cargo operations under poor,
unimproved port conditions. Eight of the ships are former
commercial vessels, purchased by the government that are
being thoroughly converted for their new role. The remaining
five ships are being newly constructed. The first squadron
is slated to sail in early 1985.
2. The Near Term Preposi
t
ioning Force (NTPF)
The forerunner of the MPS program, the NTPF
was established in 1980 after an assessment of deployment
capabilities to the regions of the world furthest away from
the U.S. such as Southwest Asia and the Indian Ocean. There
are currently eighteen MSC-controlled ships positioned in
the Indian Ocean, Pacific, and Mediterranean. Although
primarily stationary but ready to sail, these NTPF ships
carry enough equipment and supplies to support one Marine
brigade, plus material and ammunition for Army and Air Force
units. This program is essential, intact, and in-place,
ready to respond.
3. Fast Sealift Ships
Procured from the Sealand Corporation, a major
U.S. -flag containership operator, these eight ships were
acquired by the Navy in 1981. Due to high fuel consumption
rates, these fast (33 knot) SL-7 ships became uneconomical
for commercial operations. Their speed and size were
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precisely what attracted Navy buyers. In this instance,
the sale of the SL-7's benefitted both the commercial
operator and the Navy.
These Fast Sealift Ships will remain berthed
in the United States and will be capable of being activated
and placed on berth within 96 hours. Within an additional
24 hours, these ships can be loaded with all equipment for
an entire heavy mechanized Army Division. They are fast
enough to transit to Europe in five days and to Southwest
Asia in about two weeks. [24]
Designated as the T-AKR class Fast Sealift Ships,
four of these ships have been converted to military use.
Three more are due in 1985 and the last in 1986. All eight
ships are being converted in U.S. shipyards. One of these
ships, the Algol, was put to the test initially during the
Reforger '84 Exercise in Europe. Sailing from Beaumont,
Texas to Antwerp, Belgium, the Algol carried 271 tracked
and 652 wheeled vehicles along with some 230 small military
containers. [25:25]
4 . National Defense Reserve Fleet (NDRF) / and
the Ready Reserve Force (RRF)
In addition to upgrading on-line deployable
assets, the Military Sealift Command is purchasing vessels
in an effort to expand the Ready Reserve Force portion of
the NDRF. The expansions is planned to take the RRF from
its early 1984 level of 33 ships to at least 77 ships by
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1988. Ships of the RRF are laid up in reserve on both coasts
and are capable of being activated within five to ten days.
In June of 1984, nineteen dry cargo ships were purchased
by the Navy from U.S. -flag operators for the RRF and Requests
for Proposals have been issued for more. [24]
The ships of the RRF are the first line of ships
in reserve and they are relatively capable and of the type
considered to be militarily useful. The issue of the NDRF
ships is a separate matter. For the most part, these ships
are of World War II vintage and they are the primary reason
for the very old, average age of the U.S. merchant fleet.
Although this fleet numbers 171 vessels (see Table 4.2),
the majority (129) are Victory class ships, laid up at the
end of World War II as vessels not sold or scrapped through
the Merchant Ship Sales Act of 1946. These vessels are
considered of value because they are self -rsustaining break-
bulk type vessels. Yet the fact remains, they are old,
slow (15 knot) vessels that would require 20-60 days, if
not longer, to activate.' Therefore, the military usefulness,
or more appropriately their ability to be useful, is of
utmost concern. Currently, it is the opinion of some that
these old NDRF vessels would be useful for only a one-way,
one trip voyage carrying a relatively small amount of cargo.
[26] If this is the case, are the old NDRF vessels worth
the expense? Right now they are. There is nothing else
to hold in reserve, but this fleet must be updated.
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5. Other Enhancement Initiatives
Besides the active programs to build and convert
vessels for direct military support, the Military Sealift
Command has initiated programs to enhance the military useful-
ness of the current commercial fleet. Development and
procurement of "sea sheds" and "flat racks" will facilitate
the conversion of commercial containerships to militarily
useful vessels by allowing them to carry cargoes that would
not lend themselves to container izat ion such as tanks,
howitzers, and other items.
Another program will help to solve the problem
created by the large number of non-self-sustaining vessels.
Modern containerships require sophisticated shore-side loading
and unloading facilities. Current plans call for the conversion
of eleven ships into crane ships, designated TACS vessels,
which will be able to unload containerships in areas where
adequate shore facilities are not available. [2:66]
Additional programs such as these are necessary.
Not only must the government seek to have available the
militarily useful vessels that it needs, but also plans
and equipment must be available to make use of the U.S. -flag
private fleet that already exists. With the limited number
of vessels currently available, everyone must be ready and
able to help support national security objectives. These
current programs are an essential step in the right direction
of providing the short-term assets that are currently missing.
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V. LEGISLATIVE PROPOSALS
As outlined in Chapter IV, the immediate sealift needs
of the military are being addressed and funded by the U.S.
Navy. Although still significantly below a satisfactory
level, military shipping assets are being improved, both
in quality and in quantity. These direct, military improve-
ments address only one facet of our nation's maritime needs.
The economic shipping capability, provided directly by the
privately-owned, U.S. merchant marine, has not been even
adequately addressed.
The U.S. merchant marine faces not only lower-cost
competition from foreign competitors, but rules and
regulations as defined in U.S. law that further diminish
their ability to compete in the international market. The
symptoms are clear. The numbers of U.S. -flag vessels are
decreasing. As can be seen by Table 5.1, the amount of
cargo carried by U.S. -flag vessels is extremely low, both
in tonnage and in total dollar value.
In order to reverse these alarming trends in the fortunes
of U.S. -flag shipping, fundamental changes need to be under-
taken in the form of regulatory reforms and new, revised
programs. The changes must come through Congress. Innovation
and productivity-enhancing breakthroughs can provide a compe-
titive advantage only until a competitor can copy these
and implement them himself. In facing an international
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TABLE 5.1 U.S. OCEANBORNE FOREIGN TRADE/COMMERCIAL
CARGO CARRIED
Calendar Total U.S. -flag Percent Total U.S-flag Percent
Year Tons Tons of Total Value Value of Total
(Tonnag e in mill ions) ($ Val ue in Bill ions)
1947 142. 2 81.9 57.6 (Total s not avai lable
1948 139.0 67.0 48.2 for period 1947- 1955)
1949 133.2 60.3 45.2
1950 117.5 49.7 42.3
1951 193.1 76.8 39.8
1952 187.9 64.4 34.3
1953 178.0 51.7 29.1
1954 177.0 48.7 27.5
1955 226.2 53.1 23.5
1956 260.1 53.9 20.7 20.6 7.0 33.8
1957 289.3 50.8 17.6 22.8 7.3 32.1
1958 253.3 30.9 12. 2 20.9 6.0 28.6
1959 267.0 27.1 10.2 22.8 6.0 26.1
1960 277.9 31.0 11.1 24.7 6.5 26.4
1961 272.4 26.3 9.7 24.7 6.3 25.6
1962 296.8 29.6 10.0 25.9 6.5 25.1
1963 311.6 28. 5 9.2 27.5 6.9 25.1
1964 332.8 30.5 9.2 30.0 7.7 25.8
1965 371.3 27.7 7.5 32.4 6.9 21.4
1966 392.3 26.2 6.7 36.4 8.2 22.5
1967 387.6 20.5 5. 3 36.6 7.9 21.7
1968 418.6 25.0 6.0 41.1 8.5 20.7
1969 427.5 19.8 4.6 41.9 8.1 19.3
1970 473.2 25.2 5.3 49.7 10.3 20.7
1971 457.4 24. 4 5.3 50.4 9.9 19.6
1972 513.6 23.8 4.6 60.5 11.1 18.4
1973 631.6 39.9 6.3 84.0 15.9 18.9
1974 628.9 40.9 6.5 124.2 22.0 17.7
1975 615.6 31.4 5. 1 127.5 22.4 17.5
1976 698.8 33.8 4.8 148.4 26.4 17.8
1977 775.3 34.8 4.5 171.2 28.0 16.4
1978 777.0 31.9 4. 1 195.8 30.7 15.7
1979 823.1 35.0 4.2 242. 1 35.7 14.7
1980 772.2 28.2 3.7 294.3 42.3 14.4
1981 760.0 34.2 4.5 315.4 47.0 14. 9
1982 675.5 31.1 4.6 281.2 43.5 15.5
Note: Table includes Government-sponsored Cargo; excludes
Department of Defense and U.S. /Canada translake cargoes
Source: Maritime Administration, Office of External Affairs
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market where competitors are heavily subsidized or receive
preferential treatment by their nation's governments, the
U.S. merchant marine must be afforded at least an opportunity
to be competitive.
In an effort to promote a changing regulatory environment
for U.S. -flag carriers, numerous legislative proposals have
been bantered around the halls of Congress. The Shipping
Act of 1984 is the only piece of maritime legislation to
have become law in recent years. It is not a panacea for
all that ails the U.S. merchant marine. Rather it is a
step, and a relatively small one, in the right direction.
The following is a review of other legislative proposals
either formally proposed in Congress or discussed as a
possibility.
A. THE REAGAN ADMINISTRATION PROPOSALS
Faced with the problem of a dwindling merchant marine,
Ronald Reagan, as a candidate for President in 1980, pledged
to "revitalize the U.S. merchant marine". Once in office,
the Reagan administration judged that the subsidy system,
as outlined in the Merchant Marine Act of 1936, was not
achieving what it was supposed to and that it was rather
unlikely to ever do so. [22:22-25]
In May of 1982, Secretary of Transportation Drew Lewis
announced the initial plan which included seven major policy
positions supported by the Reagan administration. These
policy options were coupled with the fact that the Reagan
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administration had already cut direct subsidy support for
the CDS program and indicated that no new ODS contracts
would be negotiated. Most of these programs/options were
greeted with enthusiasm by the carriers and labor interests,
but were considered much less favorably by the shipyards.
The plan was outlined in seven points.
1. Foreign-Build Option
The first option called for continuing support of
an extension of the temporary authority (initially approved
in the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1981) for
subsidized U.S. ocean carriers to construct or acquire their
vessels outside the U.S. and still receive ODS. This option
is still endorsed by the administration and it is heartily
supported by carriers, and likewise heartily opposed by
the shipyards.
2. Eligibility For Government Cargo
Hand in hand with the first option, this revision
would provide immediate eligibility for reflagged or foreign'
built U.S. -flag vessels for the carriage of government-
impelled cargoes. There currently exists a three-year
waiting period for vessels procured in this manner before
they are eligible to carry these cargoes. [20:18]
3
.
Administrative Reform of ODS
To be accomplished by the Department of Transporta-
tion and MARAD, these administrative reforms would primarily
be implemented to increase carrier operating flexibility
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and to reduce the program's costs. Carriers have often
complained that the management controls and reporting require
ments tied to the differential subsidies have increased
their costs. In this respect, the overall effectiveness
of the programs has been reduced just by the cost of the
paperwork and special requirements that an operator must
go through just to obtain the subsidy.
Although no specific procedures/plans have been
proposed, the potential for streamlining ODS and CDS payments
exists so that dollars would be spent in their intended





Change in this policy would encourage foreign invest-
ment in U.S. shipping and permit the current 49 percent
foreign ownership- in U. S . -registered ships to be increased
to 75 percent. This could possibly attract much needed
capital while still retaining U.S. management control.
5 Duty On Repairs
The purpose of this change would be to relieve U.S-
flag ships of the current 50 percent ad valorum duty on
repairs carried out in foreign yards, thereby providing
increased flexibility for ship operatars in making repairs,
while at the same time reducing repair costs. It should
be noted that in some instances, the cost of foreign repairs,
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plus the 50 percent ad valorum tax, is still cheaper in




Reduction of unnecessary regulations in the ship-
building and ship operating industries is desirable. The
Shipping Act of 1984 incorporates a beginning of efforts
in this area. Additionally this proposal calls for the
establishment of a top level government/industry group to
study and recommend further possible reductions. [22:22-25]
It should be noted that this proposal has been implemented.
Funds were provided by Congress in the FY85 Defense
Authorization Bill for the establishment of a Merchant
Marine Defense Commission. Although results from this
Commission will not be expected within the next year, even
the establishment of such a Commission is a step in the
right dir-ection. [27]
7 Rate Regulation And The Domestic Trade
The last proposal for maritime reform put forth
by the early Reagan administration encouraged the elimination
of FMC regulations governing the rate levels of liner
companies in the U.S. domestic trades reserved under the
Jones Act. This proposal did not include any relaxation
of the cabotage laws themselves. [20]
All of these first seven proposals have proven to be
controversial with heavy support and vocal opposition being
offered on almost every proposal. With the exception of
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(1) the one-year option to build vessels in foreign yards
and flag U.S., (2) the Shipping Act of 1984, and (3) the
future formation of the Merchant Marine Defense Commission,
little has been accomplished within Congress. Not only
must legislators consider the opposing views of the ship-
builders and the ship operators, but the vested interests
of various shippers' groups likewise impact on the
legislative process.
B. OTHER LEGISLATIVE PROPOSALS
In addition to the initial seven-point plan, several
other proposals have surfaced. Unfortunately, like the
original seven, none have received the support of all
parties involved with the merchant marine industry.
!• Foreign-Build and Capital Construction Funds
Having witnessed the apparent success of the one-year
relaxation of the restrictions on foreign procurement of
vessels when 34 ships were ordered from foreign yards,
legislation was introduced into Congress in 1983 under
H.R.3156, the Build Foreign Bill, which not only proposed
to authorize the build-foreign option permanently, but also
included the provision that ship owners should be allowed
to use the tax-deferred Capital Construction Funds (CCF)
to help pay for the ships. Again ship owners supported
this bill while the shipbuilders strongly opposed it. The
result was the same: no legislation passed Congress. [28]
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2.
An Energy Conservation Program
In an effort to introduce some legislation that
would favor the shipbuilding industry, one proposal called
for the conversion of older steam-driven vessels to the
more fuel efficient, automated diesel -driven propulsion,
providing grants, similar to CDS funds, for the conversion
of these vessels in U.S. yards. The long term benefits would
be in reduced operating expenses for the ship owners by
reducing manning requirements as well as lowering fuel costs.
In the short-term, the shipyards would benefit with much
needed work. As an additional incentive, a special energy
tax credit would be granted for those companies that entered
in such a contract. This program was strongly endorsed
by the shipbuilders associations. [29]
3 A Maritime Redevelopment Bank
Most recently, H.R.3399 was introduced into the
Congress proposing a Maritime Redevelopment Bank of the
United States with the purpose of restructuring of certain
credit programs to promote innovation, increased productivity,
competitiveness and capital. This bank would not be a
government agency, but a private, for-profit corporation
with the purpose of stimulating private investment with
the purpose of enhancing' the economic, trade, and national
security of the United States. As an amendment to the
Merchant Marine Act of 1936, the bank would incorporate
the funds from the Capital Construction Fund, money from
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the Federal Ship Financing Fund, and funds made available
from the sale or trade of vessels for the government-owned
fleet and would be under the management of businessmen,
eventually elected from the stockholders.
Not only would the bank be responsible for managing
the funds of various maritime programs, it would also fund
research and development of plans for vessels, updating
shipyards while at the same time being managed to obtain
a profit for its shareholders. Although not enough time
was present in the 98th Congress to affect this bill's
passage, it will surely be resurrected in the future. [30]
4 . The Competitive Shipping and Shipbuilding
Act of 1983
Initially introduced by Congresswoman Lindy Boggs,
and co-sponsored by 82 of her colleagues, the Competitive
Shipping and Shipbuilding Act of 1983 (H.R.1242) was designed
with the purpose of reversing the decline in the U.S. merchant
marine by encouraging greater use of U.S. -flag ships through
cargo preference, particularly the transport of bulk cargoes.
Key requirements of this proposal were:
a. cargo reservation of five percent of bulk exports
and imports for U.S. -flag, U.S. -built ships,
starting in the first year after enactment and
increasing by one percent annually thereafter
until a minimum of 20 percent is reached, and
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b. 15 percent reduction in U.S. ship construction
and operating costs, primarily as a result of
series production of new ships and technical,
automation improvements allowing crew sizes
to be smaller. [31:1-1,1-9]
Obviously the shipbuilding industry strongly supported
this legislative proposal. Although not as vocal in their
support, ship operators also supported this bill. Opposition
came from those members of Congress whose constituents com-
prised the shippers who would have been required to ship
their goods and products by higher-cost, U.S. -flag vessels.
In her personal justification of H.R.-1242,
Mrs. Boggs emphasized in a speech before the Washington,
D.C. Propeller Club on February 4, 1983, that:
"Some critics of this legislation will say that cargo
reservation will damage our credibility as the world's
leader in free trade, but I think that in the real world
of 1983, we must recognize that international shipping
services are not governed by a free and open market.
Past reliance on free market mechanisms has placed the
American merchant marine at a serious competitive
disadvantage and has been partly responsible for the
dangerous decline in our fleet." [32:2]
This assessment by Mrs. Boggs regarding the world
market is probably accurate. However, the cost of cargo
preference to U.S. shippers seems to have been the major
obstacle for this bill's passage.
In assessing the economic affects of cargo preference
laws, primarily agricultural, already in existence in 1980,
the General Accounting Office (GAO) estimated that those
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cargo preference laws, which dealt primarily with government
sponsored cargoes, cost the U.S. government at least $72
million for higher ocean transportation costs in the shipment
of 2.3 million tons of civilian cargo out of a possible
12.4 million tons of government-impelled cargo shipped in
1980. [33:24] The costs of cargo preference of 20 percent
would be much greater and would be borne by the shippers,
not the government. H.R.-1242 has not yet passed.
In an effort to resurrect this type of legislation,
a new version, H.R.-6222, was introduced into Congress in
September, 1984. Although there was little hope for its
passage before Congress adjourned, H.R.-6222 was introduced
with some important modifications. The bill retains the
steady build-up in cargo preference to a maximum 20 percent,
but now it would give importers and exporters using U.S. -flag
vessels a credit for their added freight costs against taxes.
Although the administration's position is to oppose both
commercial cargo preference and tax credits as incentives,
this bill will receive increased scrutiny in the next
Congress. [24]
In introducing H.R.-6222, Representative Herbert
H. Bateman, R-Va., said:
"We cannot do what has been suggested in the past - we
cannot make our farmers, our miners, our oil producers,
and our consumers alone bear the cost of our merchant
mar ine .. .What we can finally say is that the cost of the
merchant marine is a cost of national security. It must
be paid for by all Americans." [24]
The future of legislation of this type remains to be seen.
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C. CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE OPTIONS
In August of 1984, at the request of the Senate Committee
on Armed Services, the Congressional Budget Office (CBO)
issued a report entitled U.S. Shipping and Shipbuilding: Trends
and Policy Options . In analyzing the current situation
of the U.S. merchant marine, the CBO report concluded that
measures to support the maritime industries take three basic
forms: subsidies, cargo preference, and direct government
procurement of cargo ships (see Table 5.2).
Subsidies can be either direct or indirect. Direct
subsidies, like CDS and ODS, are straightforward and visible,
but believed to distort market incentives and foster ineffi-
ciencies whose costs may exceed the direct cost of the
subsidies. Indirect subsidies, such as tax incentives and
financing support, are less visible and less precise in
accomplishing their desired objectives. Indirect subsidies
are also believed to result in inefficiencies but all
subsidies do allow policy makers some control over markets
in order to accomplish national objectives. [2:68-69]
Cargo preference is also an indirect form of support,
but the costs are borne by the economy as a whole, not a
government budget line item. The objective of cargo
preference is to create a market which will develop resources,
shipbuilding and U.S. -flag shipping, to serve that market.
Cargo preference may be unilateral, such as the Jones
Act, or by mutual agreement by trading partners. A major
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development in this area is the adoption by many nations
of a "Code of Conduct for Liner Conferences" 'ay the United
Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) . This
code would reserve a portion of each trading nation's cargo
for its national -flag carriers on a 40-40-20 basis. Forty
percent of the trade would be carried by each of the trading
partners with twenty percent left for third parties. The
United States has consistently opposed this UNCTAD code
but has entered into bilateral agreements with other nations
when U.S-flag carriage of cargo has been threatened by other
nationalistic tendencies. [2:69-70]
Cargo preference is widely used and its impact must
be dealt with, particularly in the future if the UNCTAD
code takes effect. It is a form of support that must be
closely monitored though as it may not achieve the desired
results. If the purpose of such legislation is to encourage
the building of vessels that were militarily useful, that
end might not be achieved. [2:70]
Direct procurement by the government, which is authorized
in law by Title VII of the Merchant Marine Act of 1936,
could produce exactly the numbers and kinds of ships the
government desires. Although procurement would involve direct
budgetary support, ideally the ships could be leased to
commercial operators and thereby provide some return on
the government expenditure. [2:70-71]
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Based on the projections of the DoD Sealift Study and
the Navy/MARAD sponsored SYMBA (Shipyard Mobilization Base
Assessment) study, CBO determined that a common objective
of any option would be the inducement of construction in
U.S. yards of about twenty cargo ships per year and their
subsequent operation under U.S. registry. Twenty ships
per year could eventually sustain sealift requirements while
at the same time maintain a shipbuilding industrial base
that might be needed in the event of wartime mobilization.
Additionally these ships would provide an expanded pool
of trained mariners.
1 . Option I: Subsidies
This option would reinstate the now unfunded CDS
to stimulate private investment by shipping companies to
build about twenty new ships a year in U.S. yards, and would
use ODS to supplement their operation. In order for this
option to work, operators would have to perceive a sufficient
market opportunity. Additionally, vessels would be constructed
to maximize commercial economy and efficiencies. As such,
these ships would probably be of limited military usefulness.
Costs for such a program would increase over time as more
ships came on line, receiving ODS. [2:72-73]
Table 5.3 outlines the general impact of each of
the primary options.
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TABLE 5.3 OPTIONS TO INDUCE CONSTRUCTION OF 20 MERCHANT
SHIPS ANNUALLY IN U.S. SHIPYARDS



























































Source: Congressional Budget Office
a. CDS = Construction Differential Subsidy. ODS = Operating
Differential Subsidy.




Option II: Cargo Preference
Cargo preference is widely used by many nations.
In the CBO study, cargo preference would include those laws
in effect and additionally include passage of a bill, such
as the "Competitive Shipping and Shipbuilding Act of 1983"
(H.R.-1242), or its recent follow-on H.R.-6222 as reviewed
earlier. This would gradually increase the required portion
of cargo reserved for U.S. -flag ships to twenty percent.
This option has been supported by both the shipbuilders
and the shipowners, but its probable adverse impact on
shipping rates has resulted in opposition from importers
and exporters. CBO estimates that the cost of this type
of legislation, by the time the full twenty percent cargo
reservation is reached, would be between $3.0 billion and
$4.0 billion per year, primarily as as result of increased
transportation costs. [2:73-74]
As with Option I, ships built as a result of this
measure would have to compete with each other and they would,
therefore, be designed to emphasize commercial efficiency,
not military utility. The CBO estimates that enactment
of such legislation arrangements would result is construction
orders between 20 and 30 ships per year.
3 Option III: Direct Government Procurement
The government would contract for the construction
of cargo ships directly from U.S. yards under this option.
These vessels might then be made available for lease to
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U.S. commercial operators at whatever rate the market might
bear. Although it would be foolish to assume that leasing
revenues might recover the expense of construction, it would
recover at least some of the expense.
This option would again result in the construction
of around twenty ships per year, the same as the other
options, with the same resulting benefits. The most positive
aspect of this option would be that the vessels constructed
would be designed to be militarily useful, filling the gap
in strategic sealift assets. In the event that the
commercial market could not support these additional vessels,
these ships could be laid up as a ready asset in the Ready
Reserve Force. [2:75-77]
4 . Alternatives on the Options
Looking at alternatives, it may not be fiscally
possible to finance the construction of twenty government-
sponsored ships. Ships could be acquired from the commercial
market, as is currently being done with vessels being
purchased for the RRF. This alternative does, however,
substantially reduce the amount of work available for the
shipbuilding industry. Along these lines it might be
advisable to acquire and build on an equal basis.
Several approaches might be blended. Partial
implementation of the CDS, procurement of militarily useful
vessels, even the procurement of commercial vessels built
overseas are all possible. Such a blending might serve some
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of the need of the various maritime industries, yet their
combined effect would be somewhat lessened. [2:79-80]
Table 5.4 outlines the alternative policy options.
TABLE 5.4 OTHER POLICY OPTIONS (COSTS IN 1984 DOLLARS)
Emphasize Shipbuild-
Estimated Commercial or ing Merchant
Annual Military Industry Marine
Option Cost Utility Effects Effect
Procure ships on
open market, lease
out or assign Modest, Moder-
to RRF 20 ships/ $30-300 conversion ately
year/a/ million Military work only positive
Build half in U.S.
and procure
half on open $900- Moder-
market, 20 1,200 ately
ships/year million Military Positive positive
Administration
program plus
CDS plus $500- Commercial
open market 700 and
procurement b/ million military Positive Positive
SOURCE: Congressional Budget Office
a. RRF = Ready Reserve Fleet
b. CDS = Construction Differential Subsidies. Open market




In its concluding remarks, the CBO study notes,
considering the current, competitive world market:
"...the ability of the private sector to support the
national security sealift requirements is becoming
increasingly quest ionable ... Select ion among them (the
various policy options) should probably be governed by
weighing basic objectives, especially commercial efficiency
and military utility... If the key policy objective were
the maintenance of enough U.S. shipping and shipbuilding
to provide an adequate base for national security
requirements, direct procurement would guarantee ships
that would be military useful. If the key policy objective
were, rather, to maintain more peacetime shipping for
the U.S. -flag fleet, then cargo preference or direct
subsidies would offer advantages." [2:80-81]
Overall, any of the alternatives or policy options,
whether it be those addressed by the CBO study or those
currently being addressed in Congress, will not win the
support of each and every facet of the maritime industry.
But decisions need to be made and Congress needs to act.
The results lie in the future. One thing is certain; no
action will result in a continuation of the decline of the





"It is difficult to appreciate the importance of such
a transoceanic pipeline until you are in a foreign country,
10,000 miles from home, surrounded by enemy troops, and
waiting for life-saving supplies to arrive." [35]
These were the remarks of Mr. Jerry Cople of SEA-LAND
Services, Inc., delivered in a speech before the National
Defense Transportation Association's Annual Forum, held
in September, 1984. It reflects the fact that the members
of the maritime industry have not lost sight of one of the
inherent responsibilities of their business. He continued:
"I believe we all agree... that ocean transportation and
our national defense have traveled hand-in-hand since
our country's beginnings, and they will continue to be
intertwined as long as we are committed to preserving
our national security." [35]
Although that purpose is still desirable, the fact
remains that today's U.S. merchant marine has moved away
from national security considerations in its operations.
Faced with increasing costs and lower-cost competition,
U.S. operators have sought technological advantages through
innovation. In the last several decades, that innovation
has been in the area of conta iner i za t ion , and larger vessels
seeking economies of scale. The effect has been that ship
design has, out of necessity, emphasized economy and effic-
iency. The U.S. shipping companies that have been able
to afford the necessary capital investments in new,
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competitive vessels have survived. There are far more who
have not survived. The result, as indicated earlier, is
a merchant marine that is decreasing in numbers, while at
the same time increasing in cargo carrying capacity. Table
6.1 reflects the U.S. merchant marine's position in
comparison with other merchant fleets of the world. The
trend must be viewed as alarming.
Members of the maritime industry have widely varying
opinions on which options or steps need to be taken. Many
of their differences are generated by their relative posi-
tions, whether they be shipbuilders or operators, in the
foreign or domestic trade, a liner or bulk carrier. Never-
theless, their opinions need to be evaluated.
As a general rule, most U.S. Naval officers are un-
familiar with matters concerning the merchant marine, the
problems they face, and in general the world-wide shipping
market. During the research for this thesis, it was dis-
covered that, for the most part, members of the maritime
industry were just as unfamiliar with Navy operations and
military needs. Even though both ply the same seas, there
appears to be little communication. Hopefully, this thesis
will provide some insight from at least one aspect.
B. PRIORITIES - ONLY ONE: PROFIT
One very important differentiation between the private
fleets and government-owned fleets is that the private fleets
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competitive either in price or in service, preferably both.
and ship operators survive on their ability to return a
profit. They have to have freight. They have to be
building. For shipyards in particular, once a capability
is lost, it is very difficult to reestablish. [26]
Even if ship construction and operating costs were fairly
equal between nations, the U.S. merchant marine is still
at a disadvantage. That disadvantage is in the form of
regulation, or lack of it. From an operator's standpoint:
"...the layman does not recognize that countries like
Taiwan, Japan, Singapore, China, and others, they are
developing fleets of vessels, and I mean large fleets.
That gives them an influence throughout the world. And
the U.S. (shipping) is shrinking up to nothing. These
fleets are being developed and, in some cases, they are
subsidized by their governments. In some cases, there
is absolutely no profit motive. They are not commercial
in nature, but rather an attempt to provide an influence,
to provide a posture in the world. And once they control
more and more of the freight, more and more of the ability
to handle the freight, the influence of the United States
goes down and down and down." [37]
In the opinion of some operators, the U.S. -flag vessels
are extremely over -regulated , even though the Shipping Act
of 1984 is widely considered to be a step in the right
direction. Particularly in the foreign trade, rebates and
kickbacks are a way of life, an accepted way of doing business
that goes against our ethics. What is needed is regulation
that is more realistic and that would allow the carriers
to conduct its business in the way it is done throughout
the world. [38] This idea of playing by the same set of
rules was echoed by several members of the industry.
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In the liner industry, it was stated that:
"If we can compete, under the same rules, we can go out
and get forty percent of the freight ourselves, just by
being good, commercial businessmen. We can do that!
Today!" [37]
In summing up the wide range of opinions regarding
competition in the world market, the U.S. -flag companies
do not appear to be at all afraid of competition. Quite
the contrary, they encourage it. But what is needed is
change in the regulatory restrictions facing the U.S. -flag
carriers. Some regulatory oversight may be needed to insure
fair play, but the maritime industry does not just compete
with other U.S. -flag companies unless they are involved
solely in the domestic trade. It is difficult for a
regulated, U.S. -flag company to compete with another national
flag carrier who is not necessarily profit motivated and
who does not play with the same set of rules.
These aspects of the industry must be recognized and
dealt with. It requires a coordinated policy that must
be enforced and supported by all government agencies, not
just the DoD and DoT. The State Department, Agricultural
Department, Commerce Department, and others must present
a united, one-government stand. It hasn't happened in the
past. The trends of our merchant marine show the results.
C. PROPOSED LEGISLATION
As could well be imagined, there are widely differing
opinions on what course of action the government should
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set itself in order to reverse the declining trends of the
U.S. merchant marine. What follows is a summary of the




In almost unanimous agreement, industry representa-
tives who were interviewed indicated that the CDS is not
a good option. It is recognized, even by the shipyards,
that American shipyards are not going to survive building
commercial vessels alone. CDS is viewed by some, probably
accurately, as a cause of the higher cost for shipbuilding
in U.S. yards
.
"Subsidies are not the answer. I agree that subsidies
cause inefficiencies, CDS and ODS basically, because there
is not incentive to be very competitive because there
is somebody filling the non-competitive gap... In the long
term, it doesn't help the shipyards." [36]
Regarding the ODS, as long as U.S. carriers are forced
by regulations to compete on an unequal footing with other
national-flag carriers, the ODS may be the only method of
equalizing costs.
Other proposed policy options (the authority to build
vessels in foreign yards, use of CCF funds to build foreign,
repeal of the ad valorum tax on repairs accomplished over-
seas) should be passed provided that there has been some
consideration of what shipbuilding and industrial capacity
is necessary. If it is assumed that the reason that one
has the capability of building and repairing ships in the
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United States is for defense, then that capability for non-
defense needs is not required. As long as the capacity
determined to be required of the shipbuilding and repair
base is maintained, then there should be no reason not to
build other commercial vessels overseas where ship operators
could obtain the same price as their competitors. [36]
Overall, the option to reinstate full funding for the
CDS and ODS as presented in the CBO study is considered
to be an inefficient manner in which to proceed as voiced
by the industry representatives that were interviewed for
this study.
2 . Cargo Preference
Conflicting opinions surround the policy option
of cargo preference. Cargo preference is widely viewed
as a means to eliminate foreign competition and thereby
increase the number of vessels in the U.S. merchant marine
by insuring a guaranteed amount of cargo.
The CBO study recommendation was along the lines
of the Boggs Bill, which addressed more the oil and bulk
trades. Again, depending on one's point of view in the
industry, the views on the Boggs Bill were quite different.
From inside the oil trade, one major carrier that
uses primarily foreign flag of convenience vessels stated
that the Boggs Bill was:
"...a protectionist piece of legislation from an industry
that can't get its act together. Industry has no right
to saddle the consumer with these very heavy costs..."
[39]
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Obviously, passage of such a bill would require a great
deal of shifting of assets for those companies who maintain
large fleets with foreign registration. Provisions would
have to be included in the bill as well to authorize the
reflagging of vessels to participate in the trade, such
that the end result might be that ships would not be built
anyhow, just reflagged. That would do nothing for the ship
yards. Differing opinions abound as well from a partial
implementation approach. Other representatives justify
their support for the Boggs Bill because:
"...everybody else in the world does it. Every nation
in the world that has ships instructs their people to
ship so much in their national ship. We are the suckers
of the world. But if the other guy has this advantage,
then you have to do something about it... we should
consider cargo preference somewhere along the lines of
the UNCTAD agreement, not UNCTAD itself, but cargo pre-
ference to protect American shippers." [38]
Others would take the cargo preference even further
by negotiating bilateral shipping agreements. But just
as can be seen from these remarks, there is no unified
position on the subject and there likely will never be.
The issue is so mixed up with politics, it hard to get a
good response, much less a consensus.
One important consideration is that vessels that would
be built in response to the increased cargo reserved to
be carried on U.S. -flag vessels would stress economic effic-
iency and not military utility. The commercial drive is
to efficiency and that brings you to large vessels and,
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in some cases, slow vessels not designed for military use
but for commercial trade. [39]
3 . Government Procured Shipping
As outlined in Option III of the CBO study, it was
believed that government procurement option would at least
provide some return on investment, and would, to the extent
that they would have U.S. crews onboard, provide some
positive benefit. If subsidies and cargo preference do
not result in the vessels that the government needs or
desires, then direct government procurement needs to be
seriously considered. [39]
Some argue that government designed and procured
ships would be extremely costly: first, because they would
be built in U.S. yards, and secondly, because of all of
the "junk" the military would want to put on them. [37]
Others counter that a standard design, built with series
construction methods similar to those used by the yards
during World War I and II, and adopted by the Japanese,
could reduce costs in the long run. [37] Still others are
convinced that direct procurement would provide both a sound
logistics force as well as training platforms for mariners. [26
There do exist, however, some significant possibil-
ities. If these vessels could be designed to maximize both
commercial and military utility, a compromise might be
achieved. If the purpose was to build vessels and then
lease them to commercial operators, then these vessels must
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be commercially viable. But the design needs to be a joint
design. If a vessel is built to maximize military useful-
ness, it won't be chartered because it would be unable to
return a profit. If vessels built were designed to be
economically efficient, military utility would suffer.
Why not start with a design that could do both? It is
possible if defense planners seek industry input and
ideas. [38] Why not, indeed?!
D. NATIONAL SECURITY AND THE MERCHANT MARINE
"I think it is important that we know what the military
would like to see for vessels... we never got any response
on that!" [39]
"We made a suggestion to have the military design a logistics
support ship that they would require, and to submit it
to us for comment .. .The attitude in the Navy is still,
don't tell us how to do our business." [38]
"What are the needs? What capacity do we want in the
private sector? I would like to know too." [36]
These remarks reflect much of the current thinking with
the U.S. merchant marine industries. They leave an
impression of confusion, frustration, and genuine concern.
Confusion exists in that there seems to be no firm direction
or policy. No dialog exists between the carriers and the
military except in the form of special interest lobbying
groups communicating primarily with Congress.
Frustration is building. Many individuals have expressed
their own concerns with little to no response. And genuine
concern is growing. As members of the maritime industry,
they, too, are alarmed by the trends of their industry.
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As their numbers, both shipyards and shipping companies,
get smaller and smaller, they realize that they might be
the next to disappear from the ranks of the industry. They
realize that one of their inherent tasks would be to support
our nation in time of emergency.
The size, composition, and condition of the commercial
fleet is crucial to military planners and logisticians .
But those considerations should not be left to the
commercial forces at work in the market, at least not any
longer. The separation between economic efficiency and
military utility has grown to the point where they are almost
mutually exclusive. Joint civilian and military planning
is a must for the future. The civilian maritime industries
appear to be willing to cooperate. Government planners need
to seek their input.
Along these lines, one of the primary connections
between the government and members of the maritime industry
is the Maritime Administration. The mere mention of MARAD
with some of the members of the industry who were inter-
viewed yielded some surprizing comments.
"MARAD is a toothless tiger. Frequently they are a bigger
problem than they are an assistance. Its absolutely a
crime" ..."There is a bunch of lost leaders. They wallow
around with indecision ." 1
These remarks reflect a disturbing attitude by
members of the maritime industry of the government agency
-•-Specific reference is deleted in order to safeguard
the identity of those who made these frank comments.
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whose sole purpose and charter is to promote and administer
programs designed to foster a healthy and viable U.S.
merchant marine. It seems as if MARAD has lost a great
deal of credibility. Even efforts to upgrade the NDRF and
RRF have been assumed by the Navy, yet maintaining the NDRF
is MARAD ' s responsibility.
Short of providing industry statistics and
administering financial maritime support programs, MARAD
seems to have lost its influence, particularly with the
ship operators. Without meaningful communications between
MARAD and the industry, it is doubtful that the current
problems facing these maritime industries can be adequately
addressed, short of lobbying directly with the members of
Congress
.
Some recommendations on this issue will be discussed
in the next chapter. At this crucial time in our maritime






An effort has been made in this study to examine the
very nature of the merchant marine, its history, its
problems, and its future. The history is clear. The trends
describe accurately how the merchant marine has evolved
to its present condition. The outlook for the future, if
the trends are allowed to continue, is not good. Action
needs to be taken. As can be seen by analyzing the effects
of past legislation, the results are not immediately measur-
able. In other words, if any meaningful legislation were
passed today, its overall success or failure might not be
judged until well into the 1990's.
In making decisions regarding the future of the merchant
marine, one needs to evaluate the goals or objectives that
are intended to be achieved. Are the goals commercial in
nature or based in the context of national security? Is
the policy still as stated 48 years ago, or has it changed?
Is it indeed necessary for the national defense and develop-
ment of foreign and domestic commerce, to maintain a merchant
marine? Does the merchant marine carry a "sufficient" amount
of the nation's cargo? Is the merchant marine capable of
serving as a Naval and military auxiliary in time of war
or national emergency? Are there sufficient numbers of
the right kinds of ships, mariners to operate them, and
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facilities to build and repair them? Unfortunately, the
answer to all of these questions, except for the first one
is probably no.
Shippers will always be assured of having vessels to
carry their trade. There just might not be many U.S. -flag
vessels from which to choose. The lower-cost, subsidized
foreign-flag vessels will be available. That is fine as
long as the only consideration is low-cost, commercial
transportation.
Examine for a moment the possibilities. If there is
no U.S. -flag shipping, would foreign-flag vessels carry
the military cargo overseas if it were needed to support
the one-third of the nation's troops who are forward
deployed? If there were no U.S. -flag shipping, would not
other nations be capable of driving shipping prices up for
U.S. cargoes? These are distinct possibilities. The
United States cannot afford to let the merchant marine
continue to decline.
B. EVALUATION OF LEGISLATIVE OPTIONS
1 . Subsid ies
Funding of the Construction Differential Subsidy
is no longer an issue. Not only would CDS not result in
the types of vessels that would be militarily useful, its
funding would not produce a sufficient number of new
construction ship orders for U.S. shipyards. The 1981
relaxation of the requirement that U.S. -flagged vessels
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be built in U.S. yards resulted in thirty-four new orders
being placed with foreign shipyards. It is apparent that
U.S. shipowners would like to purchase more in order to
update their fleets.
The first of these foreign-built vessels are now
becoming operational. As an example, American President
Lines (APL) has received the first of its 2,700 TEU (Trailer
Equivalent Unit) containerships built in Japan. These ships
are U.S. -flag and truly cost competitive. Not only will
these vessels receive ODS, further enhancing their
competitiveness, they also will be manned with a crew of
21 personnel. Normally a vessel of this size would be manned
with a crew of 34. [40:52-54]
The lesson is clear. American ship operators cannot
be responsible for maintaining U.S. shipyards. The option
to fully fund the CDS program would be a mistake. History
has proven that the intended benefits have not been achieved.
The proposal to build-foreign should be authorized.
In addition, every possible advantage should be authorized
to help U.S. ship operators. These include:
-the use of CCF to fund foreign construction,
-repeal of the 50 percent ad valorum tax on foreign repairs,
-immediate eligibility for ODS and government-impelled
cargoes, and
-increase the statutory limit on foreign investment from
49 percent to 75 percent.
97
These proposals would enhance the U.S. -flag competitive
position in the world market. Without the opportunity to
be competitive, investment in U.S. shipping will continue
to decline. These barriers to entry into the shipping market
must be removed.
These measures will also indirectly benefit the
maritime labor problem. None of the vessels now being held
in the NDRF and the RRF will be of any use without the sea-
going personnel to man them. Even though none of the legis-
lative proposals address the sea-going labor problem speci-
fically, it is a definite consideration. The ship operators
are pressing for reduced manning as APL did with its new
containerships . Reduced manning levels are necessary in
order for U.S. -flag vessels to be competitive. The answer
for U.S. mariners has to be more ships on which to sail,
not more positions on existing vessels.
Commensurate with the drop in the number of U.S.-
flag vessels, sea-going billets have decreased even more
drastically. From a high of 168,000 billets after World
War II, the numbers have dropped to 49,000 by 1960, to
18,828 by July of 1982, and according to the Marine Bureau
Index, the figure for 1983 was 17,170. Not only has the
number of billets decreased, the average age of seafarers
has also risen to 54 years. [41:54-56] Only one thing can
reverse this trend: more ships.
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Every competitive advantage possible must be con-
sidered. What is probably more notable, is the fact that
the passage of these options would not cost the government
anything. No government outlays are involved. The only
revenue that would be lost would be the taxes foregone by
authorizing the use of the CCF to purchase foreign-built
vessels. U.S. shipyards will not survive based on
commercial shipbuilding orders resulting from CDS because
there won't be enough of them. The demand for new
construction vessels exists as was demonstrated in 1981.
U.S. operators want to build more vessels, but in overseas
yards. In order to reverse the decline of the U.S. merchant
marine, this is a mandatory first step.
Although the CDS has been eliminated as an option,
ODS still deserves strong consideration for continued
funding. Reduced ODS funding levels may be in the future,
but these lower levels would only provide crew size parity,
not cost parity. American crews have different standards
of living that require substantial compensation. This cost
cannot be carried by the ship operators alone. Operating
cost parity needs to be approached. ODS is the vehicle
that has been used in the past.
Another alternative that must be explored by the
ship operators and the seagoing unions is productivity
improvement. If American merchant seamen are to receive
substantially greater compensation than their foreign
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counterparts, then American seamen should be at least as
productive in their work efforts. Cooperation is required
of both the seagoing personnel and the shipping companies
in this endeavor but there is room for innovation and
improvements. Even though it would be desirable for ship
operators to compete without ODS, it is not possible at
the current time. It may be possible in the future. Until
that day comes, either ODS or increasing productivity is
a necessity.
2. Cargo Preference
As currently proposed in the Competitive Shipping
and Shipbuilding Act of 1983, cargo preference is truly
a political impossibility. Even though most of the ship-
builders and ship operators agree and favor this proposal,
American shippers' groups present strong, valid opposition.
Just as the ship operators do not desire to be responsible
for subsidizing the shipbuilders, U.S. shippers are adamant
that they should not be responsible for subsidizing both
the shipbuilding and the ship operating industries.
As modified by the revised submission of H.R.-6222,
the inclusion of tax credits to shippers, importers, and
exporters would offset this substantial increase in transpor-
tation costs and transfer the burden of paying for cargo
preference to the taxpayers. Proponents argue that revenues
resulting from the expected increase in employment and
corporate activity in the shipping and shipbuilding
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industries would completely, or nearly so, offset the loss
of Treasury funds resulting from the tax credit. [34]
In the long run, the above argument may be valid.
Ship operators will, however, seek to maximize their profits
with existing assets before investing heavily in high-cost
new construction projects from U.S. shipyards. There is
no guarantee that there would even be enough shipping assets
available to carry the cargo reserved for U.S. -flag vessels.
With the reserved cargoes being primarily bulk products,
the owners who operate foreign-flag vessels, those of the
Effective United States Control (EUSC), would be heavily
affected. These EUSC shipowners, like the shipper's associa
tions, strongly oppose cargo preference [39]. Any
compromised version of the H.R.-6222 would probably include
provisions for re-flagging of some of the EUSC vessels.
The net result would still be limited shipbuilding orders,
and therefore, the primary goals of any cargo preference
legislation carry with them no guarantees of help for
American shipyards. In any event, ships utilized to carry
this cargo would stress economic efficiency, not military
usefulness
.
Cargo preference might be essential in the future,
primarily in response to efforts of Third World shipping
countries in implementing the UNCTAD code for liners. In
this regard, bilateral cargo sharing agreements may become
more common, and necessary in the future. Therefore, cargo
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preference actions may be absolutely necessary and should
not be eliminated from consideration.
3 . Direct Government Procurement
This option is currently authorized in law. [6]
It is attractive in that it could provide exactly the
numbers and types of vessels required to support the nation's
strategic sealift requirements. At the same time, vessels
might be procured that would serve the economic shipping
requirements. This is the only option that addresses the
shipping and sealift requirements, the shipbuilding indust-
rial base requirements as set forth in the SYMBA study,
and guarantees ships for the U.S. merchant marine. Based
on the cost estimates provided in the Congressional Budget
Office study, this option would be considerably more cost
effective than cargo preference legislation.
In retrospect, the U.S. maritime industries have
been in a continual state of decline since well before the
turn of the century, except for periods immediately
following World War I and World War II. During those wars,
it was massive government shipbuilding programs that reestab-
lished the U.S. merchant marine. In fact, direct procurement
has been the only successful means found in this century
for stimulating U.S. merchant shipping. [2:11]
The advantage of direct government procurement would
be that shipping assets would exist to carry freight, even
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reserved freight, and hopefully the competition for that
cargo would help in keeping shippers' costs to a minimum.
C. REVITALIZING THE MERCHANT MARINE
Policy makers must break with tradition. The history
and current trends of our merchant marine indicate that
past policies have not been totally effective at even main-
taining an adequate U.S. -flag fleet. Therefore, the policies
regarding our merchant marine need to be changed and there
are several important distinctions that need to be made.
1. Shipbuilding versus Ship Operating
The merchant marine industries of shipbuilding and
ship operating, although by their very nature related, are
two distinctly separate industries. Unfortunately ship-
builders have priced themselves out of the market with
commercial shipowners. None of the commercial ship
operators that were interviewed in gathering information
for this thesis indicated that they had any plans for new
construction with U.S. shipyards. On the subject of building
in foreign yards, several representatives indicated that
new construction orders might then be considered.
The merchant marine will not grow at all unless
the opportunity to foreign-build exists. This means then
that U.S. shipyards will have to survive based on Navy ship
construction orders and the few commercial orders that can
be expected to support the Jones Act trades and the very
specialized construction orders. Any further ship orders
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that might be placed in order to maintain a shipyard capa-
bility to construct twenty vessels per year will likely
have to come directly from the government.
2
. Commercial versus Military Usefulness
With the expanding technology of automated ship
propulsion and non-self-sustaining ship loading and un-
loading techniques now being utilized by nearly all
commercial carriers in both liner and bulk trades, the gap
between commercially efficient vessels and those that are
militarily useful is growing wider. No longer is the sole
consideration just numbers of ships.
Economic efficiency is and must be the primary
consideration of any private commercial shipping enterprise
in today's shipping market. Therefore, the formerly single
problem of having enough ships is today a dual problem:
having enough ships and of the right type.
It must be remembered that the merchant marine has
two primary objectives. One is to carry a substantial
portion of the nation's commerce and the other is to provide
a military auxiliary in time of necessity. While 200,000
DWT tankers may not be militarily useful, their continued
operation in time of crisis to help sustain the economic
aspect of our national security is essential. The same
is true of the large bulk carriers and even containerships
.
Our policy makers should not omit the importance of these
U.S. -flag vessels and even the EUSC, foreign-flagged vessels,
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Their continued operation under any flag is vital in order
to sustain the flow of raw materials and oil needed to
continue the nation's economic security.
In order to reconcile both commercial and military
objectives, what is needed is research and development
programs that would devise equipment and plans that could
enable the speedy conversion of these commercial vessels
to fulfill a military support role. Efforts of the Navy
and industry in the development of sea-sheds and flat-racks
is an example of a step in the right direction. The Navy
conversion of the eleven TACS crane ships is likewise an
essential element in these plans. These programs only
stress the use of modern conta iner ships . The oil and bulk
vessels have similar conversion possibilities that need
to be developed. As much as military planners desire to
have militarily useful vessels of the self-sustaining type,
every effort should be made to make the best possible use
of the vessels that the commercial operators have to offer.
Along these lines, commercial operators who were
interviewed, including an EUSC bulk oil operator, expressed
a keen desire and willingness to assist the government in
developing equipment for use in enhancing their vessels'
military utility. At the same time, most of these business
men expressed a desire to know exactly what the military's
needs are. They want to know how they can help. It was
105
apparent that they understand their responsibilities in
acting as a military auxiliary and are willing to respond.
The question is "How?".
The answers to these questions should be provided
by the Department of Defense and the Maritime Administration
As mentioned in Chapter VI, MARAD has apparently lost its
promotional influence, particularly with the ship operators.
Even the Navy has begun to take action independent of MARAD
in its efforts to upgrade the Ready Reserve Force. The
time is right for a change in the government's maritime
support organizations. The current proposal of a Maritime
Redevelopment Bank may provide an excellent vehicle to
accomplish this change.
With a Maritime Redevelopment Bank in existence,
run by businessmen, economical ship designs that incorporate
both military defense features and commercial efficiencies
might be researched. If these ships were then constructed
in U.S. shipyards on a direct government procurement basis,
they might subsequently be released to the Redevelopment
Bank to manage for chartering or holding in reserve. The
result would be a private, for-profit corporation operating
a business with assets being provided by the government.
With MARAD continuing to perform necessary
statistical analysis and specific administrative program
management, the new Maritime Redevelopment Bank could be
chartered to perform the vital research, development and
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maritime promotional activities necessary to revitalize
the U.S. merchant marine. An additional benefit would be
that commercial maritime industries would be working with
other businessmen, not government bureaucrats. The flow
of information might be enhanced both ways, while at the
same time serving the economic and national defense needs
of the nation.
3 . Summary
"There are three elements of a defense posture in my mind
that make sense: one, the capability of building and
repairing ships; two, the capability of controlling them
through U.S. -flag, and; three, having American citizen
crews onboard." [36]
"...As a part and parcel of maintaining an Army, a Navy,
an Air Force, with all the capabilities of defending our-
selves, but also when the need be carrying whatever battle
to fight on distant shores rather than our own shores,
one essential element to that is merchant ships for
logistics support." [38]
These comments by both shipbuilding and ship
operating representatives outline the basic elements that
incorporate the merchant marine into the national security
of the nation. The fact remains that the requirements that
would be placed upon the U.S. merchant marine industries
in time of mobilization cannot be fulfilled with the assets
currently available. Not only will military shipments be
required, but shipping to maintain the economic security
of the nation will need to be maintained as well.
In order to be able to accomplish these missions, the
t
U.S. merchant marine must be revitalized. The only means
to achieve this is to build ships of the type and number
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that would be required. The extent to which these ships
might be economically efficient would further enhance
private investment, even if only in operation through
chartering of government procured vessels. More ships will
provide increased strategic and economic shipping tonnage
as well as provide an increased pool of mariners, to man
the new vessels as well as those held in reserve. Even
foreign-built vessels would provide valuable billets for
U.S. mariners that otherwise might not exist.
Realizing that these maritime industries are private
enterprises is one aspect that always must be remembered
by legislators. The fact remains that these same enterprises
also are a vital element of the nation's security. What
needs to be remembered is that the cost of building and
maintaining the merchant marine for national defense purposes
is one of the costs of national security [34], The economic
and national security impacts of any legislation regarding
the merchant marine deserves careful, deliberate
consideration
.
The options and proposals currently before Congress
provide for many policy objectives. But what is the national
maritime policy? Is it peacetime economic shipping or the
providing of an adequate U.S. shipping and shipbuilding
base for national security? This question must be answered
now for the effects of any policy changes are not immediately
measurable.
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The choice should be clear. A carefully planned
government shipbuilding program is necessary to meet the
present and future planned sealift requirements. At the
same time, private investment needs to be encouraged. Every
advantage possible must be granted to U.S. ship operators.
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